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The  issue  of  financial  instability  of  the  U.S. 
economy  has  been  in  center  stage  at  least 
since  the  beginning  of  this  decade,  if  not  ear- 
lier.  The  blame  has  been  attributed  to  a  num- 
ber  of  factors,  among  which  the  complexity 
of  the  structure  of  the  banking  sector  as  it 
relates  to  chartering,  regulation,  supervision 
and  deposit  insurance,  and  its  role  in  mone- 
tary  policy,  is  prominent.  The  S&L  debacle 
and  the  erosion  of  the  capital  base  of  even  the 
healthiest  of  commercial  banks  at  the  end  of 
the  decade  of  the  1980s  provide  but  a  con- 
firming  need  to  revisit  the  matter  of  banking 
reform. 
The  reform  plan  proposed  by  the  Department 
of  the  Treasury  in  1991  resulted  in  the  enact- 
ment  of  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance 
Corporation  Improvement  Act  (FDICIA), 
whose  core  feature  is  to  compel  regulators  to 
intervene  when  a  bank’s  capital  is  impaired. 
The  cheers  for  the  prompt  corrective  action 
that  FDICIA  ensures  by  pushing  bad  banks 
out  of  business  certainly  dispirit  those  who 
believe  that  regulation  is  a  matter  of  judg- 
ment  and  others  who  warn  that  shutting 
down  a  capital-impaired  bank  might  prove 
costlier  than  bringing  it  back  to  health.  These 
views  notwithstanding,  FDICIA,  along  with 
the  Financial  Institutions  Reform,  Recovery, 
and  Enforcement  Act  (FIRREA)  of  1989, 
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laid,  according  to  a  consensus  of  academicians  and  lawmakers,  the  founda- 
tion  on  which  the  reorganization  of  the  banking  sector  is  to  be  built.  A 
restructured  banking  regulatory  environment  must  address  the  competence 
of  the  regulator  and  banker,  the  sophistication  of  tomorrow’s  markets  and 
financial  innovations,  and  the  assumption  that  these  cannot  be  regulated  by 
yesterday’s  regulations;  and  finally,  the  new  structure  must  engender  confi- 
dence,  above  all  else. 
.  Since  its  inception,  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  has  been  inter- 
ested  in  the  issues  of  financial  structure  and  its  relationship  to  the  develop- 
ment  of  our  economy.  The  essay  by  Professor  Bernard  Shull  and  the  pro- 
posals  he  advocates  therein  are  yet  another  contribution  to  the  Institute’s 
ongoing  research  program  on  “Reconstituting  the  Financial  Structure,” 
under  the  direction  of  Distinguished  Scholar  Hyman  Minsky.  We  are  very 
pleased  that  Dr.  Bernard  Shull  has  chosen  the  Institute’s  Public  Policy  Brief 
series  to  present  his  analysis  of  the  problems  afflicting  the  banking  industry, 
along  with  a  set  of  proposals  to  address  them. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadimitriou 
Executive  Director 
May  1993 
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Hyman  P.  Minsky 
From  the  196Os,  when  he  was  the  research 
director  for  the  Federal  Reserve  Board’s  mon- 
umental  Reappraisal  of  the  Discount 
Mechanism,  through  his  experience  as  Chief 
of  the  Banking  Markets  Section  of  the 
Federal  Reserve,  to  today  as  an  academic 
scholar,  Bernard  Shull  has  been  a  serious  stu- 
dent  and  perceptive  commentator  on  bank 
regulatory  matters  and  the  structure  of  bank- 
ing  and  financial  markets.  The  theme  of  his 
paper  is  summed  up  in  five  words:  the  limits 
of  prudential  supervision.  In  Shull’s  view 
supervision  needs  to  be  a  part  of  any  finan- 
cial  structure,  but  it  should  not  be  relied 
upon  to  transform  the  financial  relationships 
of  a  modern  capitalist  economy,  which  are 
inherently  prone  to  malfunctioning,  into  a 
mechanism  as  precise  as  the  best  of  watches. 
As  Professor  Shull  points  out,  a  standard 
response  in  the  United  States  to  a  rash  of 
bank  and  financial  institution  failures  has 
been  the  reenforcement  of  bank  and  financial 
institution  supervision  and  regulation.  As 
Shull  notes,  this  reaction  reflects  an  implicit 
theory  of  bank  crises:  “Bank  crises  are  due  to 
bad  bankers.”  Our  experience  in  this  current 
cycle  of  banking  and  financial  turmoil  is  but 
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another  example  of  this  tendency:  These  bad  bankers  may  either  be  thieves 
or  just  incompetent. 
The  legislative  response  to  the  rash  of  financial  failures  since  the  mid-1980s 
has  been  consistent  with  the  “bad  bankers”  theory  of  banking  system  mal- 
functioning.  Congress’s  response  to  the  crisis  has  increased  the  power  and 
the  number  of  regulators.  The  theory  is  that  more  and  more  powerful  regu- 
lators  would  presumably  prevent  the  wholesale  failure  of  banks  and  S&Ls. 
The  reform  of  the  regulatory  process  in  response  to  the  Treasury’s  losses  in 
validating  the  deposit  insurance  commitment  culminated  in  the  Federal 
Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Improvement  Act  of  1991  (FDICIA),  which 
embodied  a  seemingly  precise  calculus  of  the  status  of  a  bank  and  the  doc- 
trine  of  prompt  corrective  action  by  the  regulatory  bodies. 
As  Shull  emphasizes,  the  bad  bankers  theory  that  underlies  FDICIA 
assumes  away  the  possibility  that  the  occasional  development  of  crisis- 
prone  financial  structures  reflects  a  deep  characteristic  of  our  economy,  and 
that  it  may  not  be  worthwhile  to  constrain  the  developments  that  periodi- 
cally  make  banking  and  other  financial  relations  fragile.  This  is  so  because 
the  problems  in  banking  arise  after  a  period  of  exuberant  economic  perfor- 
mance:  The  tradeoff  between  longer  periods  of  exuberance  and  stagnation 
versus  shorter  periods  of  exuberance  and  stagnation  may  well  be  that  the 
benefits  of  exuberant  performance  outweigh  the  costs  of  stagnation.  If  this 
is  true,  the  proper  role  of  government  and  central  banking  would  be  to  take 
the  exuberance,  but  contain  the  damage  that  the  ensuing  increased  instabil- 
ity  would  yield. 
Shull’s  positive  recommendation  is  to  replace  the  separate  regulatory  agen- 
cies  for  different  categories  of  banks  with  a  consolidated  federal  regulatory 
agency  that  is  coordinated  with  the  monetary  policy  agency.  The  idea  of 
having  separate  and  autonomous  regulatory  and  supervisory  authorities  for 
different  categories  of  financial  and  depository  institutions  has  tended  to 
create  regulation  constrained  by  a  competition  for  the  custom  of  the  regu- 
lated.  Only  a  unified  agency  can  fully  do  the  task  of  supervising  our  com- 
plex  system. 
Furthermore,  Professor  Shull  emphasizes  that  the  supervisory  and  the  regu- 
lation  generating  agency  should  not  be  divorced  from  the  organization 
responsible  for  monetary  policy:  The  Federal  Reserve  needs  to  be  involved 
in  formulating  regulatory  policy,  and  needs  to  know  the  results  of  regzda- 
tions  and  of  monetary  policy  upon  the  viability  of  the  replated  units. 
From  1979  to  1981,  an  episode  of  practical  monetarism  forced  the  Savings 
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and  Loan  Associations  into  a  negative  net  worth  position  because  their 
assets  went  to  a  sharp  discount  from  their  face  value  as  market  interest 
rates  rose  to  an  unprecedented  level.  This  negative  net  worth  was  evident  in 
a  mark-to-market  valuation  of  longer-term  mortgage  portfolios  immedi- 
ately  after  the  rise  in  interest  rates.  Subsequently,  in  this  period  of  penal 
interest  rates,  the  net  worth  of  the  thrifts  went  below  zero  as  the  losses 
accumulated  on  carrying  their  portfolios  of  low  rate  mortgages  at  the  mar- 
ket  rate  on  liabilities. 
If  the  Federal  Reserve  had  the  responsibility  for  supervising  and  examining 
the  S&Ls,  it  would  have  been  clear  in  1979  that  anything  but  a  very  short 
period  of  very  high  interest  rates  was  an  untenable  policy  posture:  The 
mark-to-market  valuation  of  assets  clearly  showed  such  a  policy  was 
bankrupting  the  thrifts.  This  first  crisis  in  the  thrifts  was  not  a  crisis  due  to 
nonperforming  assets,  but  due  to  the  duration  of  the  interest  rate  inversion 
and  the  resulting  explosion  of  long-term  rates.  The  issue  that  the  Federal 
Reserve  would  have  had  to  face  in  1979-1980,  if  its  responsibilities  had 
been  broad  rather  than  unduly  narrow,  was  “Need  we  bankrupt  the  thrifts 
in  order  to  contain  inflation  and  sustain  the  value  of  the  dollar  on  the  inter- 
national  exchanges  ?”  With  hindsight,  the  deal  in  1979  was  poor:  The  costs 
in  the  1990s  of  the  monetary  policies  of  1979-1981  are  perhaps  much 
higher  than  was  contemplated  in  1980  or  1981. 
If  the  monetary  authorities  were  knowledgeable  about  the  potential  losses 
to  the  mortgage-holding  institutions  of  a  protracted  regime  of  high  interest 
rates,  they  would  have  moved  to  a  flexible  interest  rate  mortgage.  However, 
the  connection  between  the  nature  of  the  instruments  held  by  financial 
intermediaries  and  the  stability  of  the  financial  system  has  not  penetrated 
the  policy-making  authorities.  As  a  result  of  the  current  drop  in  interest 
rates,  a  great  deal  of  refunding  and  refinancing  of  mortgages  is  taking 
place.  The  refinanced  mortgages  are  predominantly  fully  amortized  fixed 
rate,  long-term  mortgages  (thirty  years  seems  common).  But  the  prolifera- 
tion  of  such  mortgages  means  that  even  a  small  rise  in  the  relevant  interest 
rates  will  knock  out  the  equity  of  many  organizations  that  lever  to  buy 
mortgages. 
Bernard  Shull’s  views  on  how  to  organize  regulation-and  the  domain  in 
which  we  can  expect  financial  institution  regulation-endeavor  to  have  a 
positive  impact  upon  our  economic  life. 
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Experience  over  the  past  decade  is  consistent 
with  a  long  history  of  repeated  banking  diffi- 
culties  that  indicate  supervision  and  regula- 
tion  are  not  reliable  techniques  for  sustaining 
the  safety  and  soundness  of  banks. 
Nevertheless,  repeated  reforms,  including  the 
most  recent  ones,  have  largely  been  directed 
at  augmenting  bank  supervision  and  regula- 
tion.  In  the  past,  such  reforms  have  invari- 
ably  been  disappointing. 
A  principal  reason  for  repeated  disappoint- 
ments  has  been  failure  to  effectively  address  a 
number  of  systemic  problems  that  have  con- 
tributed  to  the  repeated  difficulties.  Several 
can  be  identified,  including  an  intractable 
economic  problem  and  the  growth  of  oppor- 
tunistic  behavior.  A  key  institutional  failure 
has  been  the  fragmented  federal  regulatory 
structure.  Among  other  things,  it  impedes 
regulatory  planning,  undermines  the  legiti- 
macy  of  supervision,  and  makes  it  nearly 
impossible  for  the  regulatory  agencies  to  deal 
effectively  with  important  systemic  problems. 
In  Section  I,  systemic  reasons  for  bank  regu- 
latory  failures  are  briefly  discussed.  In  Section 
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II,  the  role  of  the  fragmented  system  in  impeding  efforts  to  deal  with  these 
issues  is  evaluated.  The  inadequacy  of  recent  and  proposed  reforms  is 
reviewed  in  Section  III,  while  Section  IV  outlines  a  proposal  for  regulatory 
reorganization. 
The  proposal  is  for  a  unification  of  the  federal  bank  regulatory  agencies 
that  currently  have  authority  over  competing  depository  institutions.  The 
reorganization  would  follow  a  “functional  subsidiary”  model  integrating 
monetary  policy  and  deposit  insurance  authority,  along  with  conventional 
regulation  and  supervision.  Such  integration  is  desirable,  in  and  of  itself, 
and  would  constitute  a  first  step  toward  dealing  with  the  systemic  problems 
that  have  plagued  the  banking  system.  It  might  be  accomplished  through 
modification  of  the  existing  Federal  Reserve  System  or  in  a  new  organiza- 
ti0n.l 
I.  SUPERVISORY  AIMS  AND  SYSTEMIC  REASONS 
FOR  BANKING  PROBLEMS 
The  aims  of  supervision  are  typically  specified  as: 
l  protecting  depositors,  and/or 
l  protecting  the  insurance  funds,  and/or 
l  protecting  the  payments  mechanism  and/or 
l  protecting  the  money  supply,  and/or 
l  assuring  that  banks  abide  by  laws  that  constrain  the  private  use 
of  their  resources  (e.g.,  the  Community  Reinvestment  Act) 
In  general,  each  of  these  objectives  may  be  viewed  as  involving  a  public 
function  that  banks  perform. 
While  it  is  often  said  that  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  supervision  to  keep  banks 
from  failing,  these  functions  cannot  be  served  by  failing  or  failed  banks, 
particularly  if  problems  are  system-wide.  It  is  understandable,  then,  that 
supervisors  are  not  simply  concerned  with  closing  insolvent  banks,  but  also 
aim  at  sustaining  banks  as  viable  institutions.  It  is  incumbent  on  them  to 
explain  why  banks  fail  when  they  do. 
Mismanagement  as  a  cause  of  bank  failure  has  been  a  recurrent  theme  [for 
an  early  example  of  the  incipient  “supervisory  attitude,”  see  Hammond, 
1957,  p.  2011.  It  has  emerged  repeatedly  in  studies  by  supervisory  agencies 
in  a  succession  of  banking  problems  and  crises  over  the  last  70  years 
14  Public  Policy  Brief Reorgunizing  the  Federal  Bank  Reguhtory  Agencies 
(Friedman  &  Schwartz,  1963,  pp.  269-70  and  358-59;  Comptroller  of  the 
Currency,  1930,  pp.  307-321).  Walter  Spahr  epitomized  the  “supervisory 
attitude”  when  he  wrote  that  “it  is  probably  not  possible  to  separate 
(the)...failures  due  to  incompetent  management  from  those  due  to  local 
business  depressions  since  it  is  the  purpose  and  test  of  good  bank  manage- 
ment  to  avoid  the  effects  of  local  financial  depressions”  (Spahr,  1932,  p, 
220). 
In  the  mid-197Os,  the  reemergence  of  large  bank  failures  evoked  the  tradi- 
tional  supervisory  response.  The  federal  banking  agencies  pointed  to  inept 
management  and/or  fraudulent  practices  as  the  principal  cause  (First 
Meeting  on  the  Condition  of  the  Banking  System,  1977,  pp.  1022-1025, 
1077-1081,  1154-1167;  FDIC,  1984,  p.  13).  In  the  late  198Os,  the 
Comptroller  indicated  a  “1  ong-held  belief”  that  bank  management  and 
boards  of  directors  bear  ultimate  responsibility  for  bank  problems  that 
were  the  cause  of  most  bank  failures  (Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  1988, 
P-  11. 
It  is  a  small  step  from  identifying  management  deficiencies  as  the  principal 
cause  of  bank  failure  to  finding  that  supervision  needs  to  be  augmented  and 
improved.  The  currently  active  federal  agencies  provide  a  living  historical 
record  of  the  continuing  efforts  to  provide  such  improvement.  An  explicit 
purpose  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  of  1913  was  “to  establish  more  effective 
supervision  of  banking  in  the  United  States.”  The  massive  bank  failures  of 
the  early  1930s  were  attributed  by  many  to  both  inadequate  bankers  and 
inadequate  supervision.  “Chief  reliance  has...been  placed  on  bank  examina- 
tions  . . ..In  many  cases,  these  examiners  were  less  qualified  for  their  jobs 
than  the  bankers  were  for  theirs”  (Gephart,  1935,  p.  84).  The  measures 
required  to  remedy  the  “constitutional  weaknesses”  of  the  system,  as  seen 
by  the  Senate  Banking  Committee  in  reporting  the  Glass  Bill  in  May  1933, 
have  a  familiar  ring.  They  include  increased  capital  requirements,  stronger 
supervision,  restriction  of  investments,  the  “truthful”  valuation  of  assets, 
and,  of  course,  deposit  insurance  (Senate  Banking  Report,  1933,  p.  11). 
Comprehensive  banking  reform,  traditionally  including  augmented  and 
improved  supervision,  has  typically  evoked  a  transcendent,  and  in  retro- 
spect,  unwarranted  optimism.  The  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  announced 
in  1914  that,  with  the  new  Federal  Reserve  Act,  “financial  and  commercial 
crises,  or  panics...seem  to  be  mathematically  impossible”  (Comptroller  of 
the  Currency,  1914,  p.  10).  Seventy-five  years  later,  confronting  the  S&L 
disaster  with  yet  another  comprehensive  reform-the  Financial  Institutions 
Reform,  Recovery,  and  Enforcement  Act  (FIRREA)-the  Secretary  of  the 
Tbe]erome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College  1S The  Limits  of  Prudential  Supervision 
~3 Treasury  (Nicholas  Brady)  proclaimed  “two  watchwords  guided  us  as  we 
undertook  to  solve  this  problem:  Never  Again”  (Brady,  1989,  p.  1). 
The  S&L  debacle  of  the  198Os,  the  high  rate  of  commercial  bank  failure 
over  the  last  decade,  and  the  resulting  depletion  of  the  deposit  insurance 
funds  are  indicative  of  another  supervisory  and  regulatory  failure.2  Again, 
bankers  and  supervisors  can  and  have  been  blamed.  And  the  reforms  to 
date,  as  discussed  below,  are  indicative  of  this  conventional  wisdom. 
As  in  most  cases  of  repeated  failure,  we  are  better  served  by  looking  for  sys- 
temic  problems.  At  least  several  can  be  identified,  including  an  economic 
problem  (the  effects  of  monetary  surprises  and  exogenous  shocks)  and  at 
least  two  institutional  failures  (opportunistic  behavior  among  banking 
organizations  and  a  fragmented  regulatory  structure). 
A.  Monetary  Surprises  and  Exogenous  Shocks 
Unanticipated  changes,  whether  emanating  from  sudden  and  drastic  shifts 
in  monetary  policy  (monetary  surprise),  or  from  exogenous  shocks  to  bank- 
sensitive  sectors  and  markets,  may  produce  an  escalation  of  pressure  to 
which  banks  are  unable  to  adjust  quickly.3 
During  a  long  period  of  expansion,  then,  bank  managements’  assessments 
of  the  probability  of  “shocks”  tends  to  be  biased  downward.  Banks  tend  to 
take  greater  risks  than  an  objective  assessment,  if  such  were  possible,  would 
warrant.  Indeed,  competition  is  likely  to  require  that  banks  take  greater 
risks  than  is  warranted  (Guttentag  &  Herring,  1986,  pp.  2-4).  In  the  late 
!  196Os,  Minsky  referred  to  this  phenomenon  as  “the  economics  of  eupho- 
ria,”  and,  more  recently,  Guttentag  and  Herring  have  labeled  it  “disaster 
myopia”  (Minsky,  1971,  p.  100-103;  Guttentag  &  Herring,  1986,  pp.  3-4). 
The  onset  of  a  shock  due,  for  example,  to  the  inability  of  one  or  more  large 
banks  to  replace  volatile  liabilities  (Continental  Illinois,  1984;  Bank  of  New 
England,  1990)  may  leave  many  other  banks  excessively  exposed.  A  shock, 
with  similar  policy  implications,  may  be  generated  by  severe  monetary 
restraint  to  control  inflation  that  abruptly  elevates  market  interest  rates 
(1979-1982).  Threatened  with  insolvency,  banks  are  likely  to  take  greater 
risks,  and  doing  so  is  likely  to  result  in  higher  rates  of  insolvency  (Golbe  & 
Shull,  1991;  Barth,  Bartholomew  &  Labich,  1990). 
The  problem  implies  that  bank  supervisors  need  to  be  aware  of  developing 
fragility  and  of  the  growing  vulnerability  of  banks  to  both  monetary  sur- 
prise  and  other  shocks  during  expansions.  But  traditional  supervision  has 
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focused  on  identifying  weak  banks  and  correcting  their  weaknesses.  It  has 
not  focused  on  identifying  vulnerable  banks  and  leaning  against  their 
fragility  (Minsky,  1975;  Guttentag  &  Herring,  1988,  p.  602).  There  is  also 
some  evidence  that  regulators  are  afflicted  by  the  same  perceptual  problems 
as  bank  managements  (Guttentag  &  Herring,  1986,  p.  33;  Peterson,  1977, 
pp.  27-28).“ 
B.  Opportunism 
In  recent  years,  there  has  been  a  substantial  increase  in  insider  abuse  and 
criminal  misconduct  in  banking.  5  The  legislative  response  has  been  to 
establish  more  extensive  supervision  and  harsher  penalties. 
Widespread  insider  abuse  and  criminal  misconduct  constitutes  a  substantial 
burden  on  supervision.  Like  any  form  of  appraisal,  supervision  is  simpler 
when  those  being  appraised  recognize  the  legitimacy  of  the  evaluation, 
believe  it  is  of  benefit  to  them,  view  themselves  as  participants  with  com- 
mon  interests,  and  generally  govern  their  institutions  with  an  attitude  of 
“stewardship.“6  It  is  more  difficult  when  those  being  appraised  are  intent 
on  distortion  and  obfuscation.  There  has,  from  time  to  time,  been  a  sense  of 
stewardship  among  bankers  that  has  been  encouraged  by  supervisors. 
The  upsurge  in  misconduct  can  be  viewed  as  an  institutional  failure.  There 
has  been  no  definitive  study  of  the  causes  for  an  increase  in  misconduct  in 
banking. 
C.  The  Fragmented  Regulatory  Structure 
The  problems  created  by  a  fragmented  federal  bank  regulatory  system  have 
long  been  under  discussion.  Unification  of  federal  bank  supervision  was 
proposed  in  Congress  as  early  as  1919,  again  in  the  193Os,  and  on  numer- 
ous  subsequent  occasions  (Robertson,  1966,  p.  686;  Horvitz,  1982; 
Blueprint  for  Reform,  1984,  pp.  27-33;  Treusury  Report,  1991,  pp.  IX-6- 
IX-8,  XIX;  and  Shull,  1993). 
A  decisive  critique  of  the  current  regulatory  agency  arrangement  was  sub- 
stantially  complete  by  the  end  of  the  197Os,  and  there  was  both  anecdotal 
and  empirical  support  for  many  of  its  shortcomings  (Robertson,  1966; 
Hackley,  i969;  and  Lapidus  et  al.,  1980). 
Among  other  things,  the  current  system  produces  overlaps  of  responsibility 
and  duplication  of  effort  that  result  in  excessive  cost  either  through  redun- 
dancy  or  in  efforts  to  divide  responsibility  and  coordinate;  and  it  imposes 
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differential  costs  on  competing  depository  institutions.  It  has  also  generated 
agency  conflict  that  has  undermined  supervisory  discipline  and/or  imposed 
excessive  burdens  on  banks  (&epr&  for  Reform,  1984,  p.  29,  note  16; 
Shull,  1980;  Huston,  1985;  Hackley,  1969).  Differential  regulatory  envi- 
ronments  induce  competing  depository  institutions  to  seek  the  most  attrac- 
tive  regulatory  regime,  permit  escape  from  supervisory  restraints  imposed 
on  individual  institutions,  and  tend  to  erode  regulation-in  other  words,  a 
competition  in  laxity  (Burns,  1975). 
Of  particular  importance,  problems  have  been  solved  inefficiently  or 
remained  unsolved  because  the  agencies  have  difficulties  in  “sharing 
responsibility...problems  of  interagency  coordination  may...(undermine) 
confidence  in  the  financial  system”  (Mtiepr&  for  Reform,  1984,  p.  31). 
This  inability  implies  constraints  on  strategic  policy,  for  which  a  number  of 
examples  are  available  (see  Shull,  1993,  p.  100). 
Finally,  the  existence  of  multiple  agencies  with  overlapping  and  partial 
responsibilities  obscures  accountability  (Treusury  Report,  p.  XIX-4). 
Responsibility  can  be  shifted  or,  at  worse,  diminished  by  sharing. 
Two  principal  arguments  have  been  made  in  favor  of  the  existing  structure. 
First,  that  a  fragmented  system  imposes  checks  on  arbitrary  government 
authority.  And  second,  that  competition  among  regulators  promotes  experi- 
mentation,  and  erodes  anticompetitive  restrictions  (see  Scott,  19.79;  Treu- 
swy  Report,  Ch.  XIX).  But  developments  in  recent  years  have  strengthened 
the  critique  of  the  existing  arrangements  and  undermined  their  defense. 
’  In  the  198Os,  differentially  permissive  federal  and  state  regulation  of  S&Ls 
provided  a  morbid  illustration  of  the  destructive  regulatory  competition 
and  differential  cost  problems.  It  is  noteworthy  that  excessively  lax  S&L 
regulation  in  the  early  19 80s  led  some  commercial  banks  to  become  S&Ls 
(Isaac,  1984,  pp.  1667-68).  Forbearance  for  insolvent  thrifts,  and  the  rela- 
tively  high  rates  they  were  willing  to  pay  for  deposits,  injured  not  only  sol- 
vent  thrifts  but  also  commercial  banks  (Brumbaugh,  1988,  pp.  70ff.). 
The  case  for  unification  has  become  increasingly  persuasive  in  recent  years. 
With  an  intensification  of  competition,  differential  regulatory  costs  have  as- 
sumed  even  greater  importance,  made  confusion  generated  by  supervisory 
overlaps  less  acceptable,  and  timely  policies  to  assist  bank  adaptation  to 
rapidly  changing  financial  markets  critically  important.  Global  banking  and 
international  regulatory  agency  deliberations  (e.g.,  to  establish  uniform  cap- 
ital  standards)  place  new  demands  on  agency  coordination.  And,  in  light  of 
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recent  debacles,  regulatory  agency  accountability  has  become  even  more 
essential. 
Arguments  for  a  fragmented  regulatory  system  may  have  been  more  persua- 
sive  when  there  were  more  anticompetitive  regulations  to  erode.  With  inter- 
est  rate  restrictions  on  deposits  eliminated-and  branch  banking  and  activ- 
ity  restrictions  in  the  process  of  elimination-the  benefits  of  further  erosion 
are,  for  the  time  at  least,  dubious.  \ 
Finally,  it  is  now  clear,  if  it  was  not  always,  that  the  “checks  and  balances” 
afforded  by  multiple  agencies  are  just  one  of  several  types  of  constraints. 
Others  that  constrain  regulatory  agencies  include  industry  pressure,  litiga- 
tion,  and  congressional  oversight.  For  example,  the  transfer  of  regulatory 
authority  from  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  (FHLBB)  to  the  Office 
of  Thrift  Supervision  (OTS)  was  justified  by  evidence  that  the  FHLBB,  an 
Yndependent”  agency  with  sole  federal  authority  over  S&Ls,  had  been 
excessively  “checked”  by  industry  and  congressional  pressure,  and  needed 
t 
to  be  “insulated”  (Greenspan,  1989,  p.  6). 
Il.  TlE  -  REGlJlATmY SYSTM 
ANDsYs=rEMlcPmmLms 
The  difficulties  endured  by  federal  agencies  in  sharing  responsibility  implies 
a  diminished  capacity.  Important  policies  developed  at  any  one  agency  may 
conflict  with  those  of  the  others  and,  consequently,  be  frustrated.  It  is, 
moreover,  unlikely  that  agencies  will  confront  issues  involving  the  develop- 
ment  of  policies  likely  to  be  frustrated.  Consequently,  coming  to  grips  with 
important  policy  problems,  such  as  the  hazards  of  exogenous  shock  and 
monetary  surprise,  and  constraining  opportunism  is  seriously  hampered  by 
fragmentation. 
The  way  in  which  important  issues  can  be  ignored  by  the  regulatory  agen- 
cies  is  characterized  by  the  “too-big-to-fail”  policy.  It  has  long  been  clear 
that  classifying  the  very  large  banks  as  “too-big-to-fail”  creates  perverse 
incentives  for  them,  and  serious  competitive  problems  for  other  banks. 
Nevertheless,  none  of  the  federal  regulatory  agencies  even  considered 
merger  restrictions  to  prevent  banks  becoming  “too  big  to  fail.”  The  lack  of 
appropriate  policy  in  this  area  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  no  one 
agency  would  be  willing  to  restrict  acquisitions  by  banks  within  its  regula- 
tory  domain  unless  the  others  would  follow  suit:  Coordination  in  this  area 
could  not  be  expected.  ’ 
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Another  example  involves  exogenous  shock  and  monetary  surprise.  A 
proper  focus  requires  analyses  that  increase  supervisory  awareness  of  bank 
vulnerabilities.  It  has  only  been  in  recent  years  that  serious  efforts  have 
been  made  to  incorporate  interest-rate  risk  and  interest-rate  change  scenar- 
ios  into  supervisory  calculations  (Houpt  &  Embersit,  1991;  see  also 
Hanweck  &  Shull,  1993).  Of  the  federal  regulatory  agencies,  only  the 
Federal  Reserve  appears  to  be  clearly  aware  of  the  problem  (Federal 
Reserve  Board,  1984),  but  none  have  dealt  with  it  effectively.7 
A  source  of  the  difficulty  is  that  “leaning  against  fragility”  by  one  agency 
leaves  it  exposed  to  severe  criticism  when  other  supervisory  agencies  are  not 
doing  so.  In  the  past,  it  has  placed  the  Federal  Reserve  in  the  way  of  banks 
and  other  regulatory  agencies  that  literally  did  not  see  the  reasons  for  foot 
dragging. 
Finally,  as  noted,  the  fragmented  system  has  tended  to  erode  constraints  in 
general  (i.e.,  promoted  a  competition  in  laxity).  In  this  way,  the  system 
, 
attacks  its  own  effectiveness  and  legitimacy.  Agency  competition,  if  not 
agency  differences,  implies  that  supervision  is  arbitrary,  and  supervisors  can 
be  viewed  as  capricious  in  insisting  on  any  particular  set  of  rules.  Hence, 
evading  supervision  and  regulation  takes  on  the  character  of  an  activity  for 
which  the  social  consequences  are  trivial. 
The  seeming  arbitrary  nature  of  supervision  suggested  by  differences  among 
the  agencies  is  fertile  ground  for  the  growth  of  insider  abuse  and,  more  gen- 
erally,  opportunism.  In  turn,  opportunism  tends  to  compromise  supervi- 
sion.  Supervisors  become  torn  between  their  obligations  to  support  bank 
’  profitability  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  prevent  dubious  practices  (which,  Ed 
ante,  are  not  obviously  abusive,  and  which  seem  to  contribute  to  profitabil- 
ity)  on  the  other.  In  periods  of  prosperity,  they  may  be  reluctant  to  substi- 
tute  their  judgement  for  that  of  bank  management,  and  reluctant  to  restrict 
the  banks  they  supervise  when  their  competitors,  supervised  by  others,  are 
not  restricted.  In  times  of  bank  distress,  difficulties  arise  for  the  same 
underlying  reason.  In  addition,  when  supervisors  are  confronted  with  banks 
at  or  near  insolvency,  they  become  understandably  anxious  to  find  buyers 
who  will  inject  new  capital.  The  S&L  experience  of  the  1980s  suggests  that 
standards  for  evaluating  the  character  of  new  owners  can  suffer  in  the  anxi- 
ety  to  find  investors. 
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Ill.  INADEQUACY OF  THE  1989-91  REFORMS 
Recent  banking  legislation,  particularly  FIRREA  and  FDICIA,  has  aimed  at 
remedying  the  problems  that  have  emerged.  While  moving  toward  unifor- 
mity  of  specific  regulations  by  legislative  mandate,  and  also  toward  analy- 
ses  of  some  types  of  bank  vulnerability  as  opposed  to  existing  weakness, 
neither  of  these  acts  meets  the  objectives  of  agency  unification.  Both  reflect 
the  traditional  tendency  to  augment  supervisory  authority  in  response  to 
banking  problems. 
FIRREA  included  major  changes  in  supervision  that  affected  not  only  sav- 
ings  associations  but  other  depository  institutions  and  bank  holding  com- 
panies.  In  general,  it  tightened  constraints  on  federal  savings  associations, 
extended  federal  constraints  to  state-chartered  associations;  and  imposed 
other  restrictions  applicable  to  national  and  member  banks.  Among  other 
things,  it  raised  the  capital  requirements  of  savings  associations  to  levels  no 
less  stringent  than  those  applicable  to  national  banks  (Title  III,  Sec.  301), 
and  imposed  National  Bank  and  Federal  Reserve  Act  limits  on  lending  to 
one  borrower,  lending  to  insiders,  and  on  interaffiliate  transactions  (Title 
III,  Sec.  301).  It  prohibited  institutions  not  meeting  capital  requirements 
(“troubled  institutions”)  from  engaging  in  certain  activities,  including 
accepting  brokered  deposits,  offering  above-market  interest  rates  on 
deposits,  lending  to  business  development  corporations,  increasing  assets, 
and,  for  state  associations,  exercising  “expanded  powers”  permitted  under 
state  law.  The  FDIC  was  given  “backup  enforcement  authority”  over  all 
savings  associations. 
Moreover,  FIRREA  augmented  the  authority  of  all  the  federal  agencies  to 
ferret  out  potential  problems,  impose  timely  restrictions,  and  discipline 
recalcitrant  bank  officials  (Title  IX).  In  addition  to  strengthening  criminal 
sanctions,  it  substantially  increased  civil  money  penalties,  up  to  $1  million 
per  day,  for  violating  written  agreements  or  orders,  or  for  filing  false  or 
misleading  reports. 
Comprehensive  reform  was  again  proposed  by  the  Treasury  in  1991 
(Treastiry  Report).  An  “administration  bill,”  based  on  the  Report,  was 
introduced  in  Congress.  The  bill,  which  provided  for  the  recapitalization  of 
the  Bank  Insurance  Fund  (BIF),  included  measures  to  relax  restrictions  on 
interstate  branching,  lift  restrictions  on  securities  and  insurance  activities, 
and  permit  ownership  of  bank  holding  companies  by  commercial  firms. 
The  act  that  was  passed,  FDICIA,  did  not  adopt  the  administration’s  pro- 
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posals  on  branching,  new  activities,  or  holding  company  ownership.  But  it 
did  augment  supervision  in  a  number  of  ways  by:  (1)  requiring  that  federal 
supervisors  perform  additional  on-site  bank  examinations  through  annual 
independent  audits  for  larger  institutions  (Title  I,  Sets.  111-12);  (2)  giving 
supervisors  authority  to  prescribe  and  enforce  detailed  managerial  and 
operational  standards  for  purposes  of  “safety  and  soundness”;  and  (3)  fur- 
ther  extending  federal  authority  to  state  banks  by  imposing  limits  on  insur- 
ance  underwriting  and  equity  investments  to  those  applicable  to  national 
banks  (Title  III,  Sec.  303). 
Of  particular  importance,  FDICIA  elaborated  the  “troubled  institution” 
approach  of  FIRREA  by  establishing  a  system  of  “prompt  corrective 
action,”  involving  the  imposition  of  escalating  constraints  on  undercapital- 
ized  banks  (Title  I,  Section  131).  Five  capitalization  categories  were  estab- 
lished:  “well-capitalized,”  “adequately  capitalized,”  “undercapitalized,” 
“significantly  undercapitalized,”  and  “critically  undercapitalized.”  The  law 
requires  federal  banking  agencies  to  augment  conventional  risk-based  stan-  x 
dards,  based  on  book  values,  with  requirements  based  on  interest-rate  risk.8 
A  determination  by  the  relevant  federal  supervisory  agency  that  a  bank  is  in 
one  of  the  lower  three  categories  automatically  triggers  the  requirement 
that  it  submit  an  acceptable  capital  restoration  plan.  “Undercapitalized” 
banks  failing  to  submit  and  implement  an  acceptable  plan  are  subject  to 
constraints  on  asset  growth,  nontraditional  activities,  transactions  with 
affiliates,  and  deposit  rates  of  interest,  among  others.  Those  .“critically 
undercapitalized”  are  subject  to  additional  constraints  and,  under  the  law, 
must  be  closed  promptly.9 
This  approach  may  seem  to  compel  federal  agency  uniformity  for  the  three 
commercial  bank  regulators,  and  to  limit  supervisory  discretion.  But  in  key 
areas,  the  limit  on  discretion  is  illusory.  The  federal  supervisors  have  been 
given  broad  authority  to  develop  cooperatively  the  capital  adequacy  thresh- 
olds  that  activate  supervisory  constraints.  It  was  recently  noted  that  “...the 
regulators  have  opted  for  a  narrow  definition  of  ‘undercapitalized’  that 
sticks  less  than  5%  of  the  industry  with  the  unwanted  label.”  Andrew 
Hove,  Chairman  of  the  FDIC,  was  reported  to  have  acknowledged  that 
“(w)e  could  have  set  the  capital  levels  a  lot  higher”  (Rehm,  1992).  And  the 
required  closing  of  a  “critically  undercapitalized”  bank  is  subject  to  agency- 
determined  exceptions;  it  need  not  be  closed  if  the  bank’s  federal  supervisor 
and  the  FDIC  jointly  determine  that  it  has  an  acceptable  capital  restoration 
plan  and  is  viable. 
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IV.  BASES  FOR  UNIFICATION  OF  THE 
REGULATORY  AGENCIES 
Even  after  the  major  legislation  of  the  past  several  years,  there  remain 
urgent  reasons  for  unification  of  the  federal  banking  agencies.  These  rea- 
sons  emerge  in  a  critical  analysis  of  the  Treasury’s  proposal  for  regulatory 
agency  reorganization  in  1991  (Treasuv  Report).  The  Report  proposed 
that  the  FDIC  be  relieved  of  direct  supervisory  authority  over  insured  state 
nonmember  banks,  that  authority  over  national  banks  and  thrifts  (now  in 
the  OCC  and  the  OTS)  be  consolidated  into  a  new  Federal  Banking  Agency 
(FBA)  in  the  Treasury  Department,  and  that  federal  authority  over  state- 
chartered  banks  be  consolidated  in  the  Federal  Reserve.  Holding  company 
authority  would  be  divided  between  the  new  FBA  (if  the  lead  bank  were 
national)  and  the  Federal  Reserve  (if  the  lead  bank  were  state-chartered). 
The  apparent  result  would  be  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  federal  supervi- 
sory+agencies  from  5  to  3  (FBA,  Federal  Reserve,  and  National  Credit 
Union  Administration  [NCUA]).  In  fact,  FDIC  supervisory  responsibilities 
would  not  be  eliminated,  and  the  proposal  fails  to  recognize  any  need  to 
unify  the  monetary  authority  with  bank  supervision. 
A.  Supervision  by  the  Deposit  Insurance  Agency 
It  is  not  practical  for  the  FDIC  to  withdraw  from  the  exercise  of  its  supervi- 
sory  authority,  or  to  abstain  from  involvement  in  the  development  of  regu- 
lations  that  effect  bank  solvency  (e.g.,  capital  requirements).  The  Treasury 
proposal  would  not  effectively  “consolidate”  by  nominally  eliminating  the 
FDIC’s  authority  over  insured  nonmember  banks. 
The  moral  hazard  and  excessive  risk-taking  because  of  deposit  insurance 
has  required  the  FDIC  to  have  supervisory  authority  to  protect  its  fund.  In 
recent  years,  depletion  of  federal  deposit  insurance  funds  has  resulted  in 
legislation  expanding  FDIC  authority.  Under  Title  II  of  FIRREA,  the 
FDIC’s  regulatory  authority  over  both  federal  and  state  savings  associations 
was  expanded.  Under  FDICIA,  the  FDIC  has  been  given  similar  authority 
over  state-chartered  commercial  banks. 
Any  asserted  “conflict”  between  insurance  administration  and  bank  regula- 
tion  appears,  at  best,  an  undeveloped  hypothesis  that  seems  to  have 
emerged  from  the  observed  behavior  of  the  now  defunct  Federal  Home 
Loan  Bank  Board  (FHLBB)  and  Federal  Savings.  and  Loan  Insurance 
Corporation  (FSLIC)  in  the  1980s.  The  FHLBB  kept  insolvent  S&Ls  open, 
it  is  alleged,  at  the  expense  of  prudent  insurance  administration  (See,  for 
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example,  Clark,  1989,  pp.  24Off.).  However,  no  evidence  is  available  to 
indicate  that  an  independent  FSLIC  would  hage  closed  S&Ls  earlier. 
Forbearance  might  just  as  easily  be  seen  as  a  joint  failure  in  competence 
and/or  foresight. 
B.  The  Role  of  the  FederaI  Reserve 
From  time  to  time,  the  Federal  Reserve  has  argued  that  it  must  continue  its 
involvement  in  supervision  because  monetary  policy  periodically  imposes 
severe  pressure  on  bank  reserve  positions,  bank  liquidity,  the  value  of  bank 
assets,  and,  indirectly,  on  the  ability  of  bank  borrowers  to  repay  their 
loans.  The  standards  established  by  other  agencies  are  not  likely  to  be  ade- 
quate  for  monetary  policy  purposes. 
“(T)he  failure  of  supervisors...  , to  have  foreseen  potential 
strains...can  either  cos~&W  the  ability  of  the  central  bank...to  meet  mone- 
tary  policy  objectives  or  create  a  situation  in  which...monetary  restraint 
pushes  the  stability  of  the  system...beyond  the  breaking  point.”  ‘And  ’ 
“...supervisory  arrangements  should  encourage  continuing  concern  with  the 
ability  of  the  banking  system  to  withstand  potential  pressure  even  during 
long  periods  of  fair  weather,  when  temptations  may  develop  to  cater  to  the 
instincts  of  the  most  aggressive  banking  entrepreneurs”  (Federal  Reserve 
Board,  1984,  pp.  549-50). 
burther,  it  has  been  argued  that  evaluation  and  modification  of  standards 
car-i  only  be  accomplished  through  an  active  supervisory  role  (Federal 
Reserve  Board,  pp.  551-52;  Greenspan,  1991,  p.  34).  Finally,  as  a  lender  of 
:  last  resort,  it  requires  leverage  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  crises  (Federal 
Reserve  Board,  pp.  548-9). 
Monetary  restraint  in  the  early  1980s  provides  an  illustration  of  the  prob- 
lem  visualized.  As  Brumbaugh  has  observed,  a(i)n  October  1979  the  Federal 
Reserve  made  a  decision  with  ruinous  results  for  the  thrift  industry....(It) 
changed  from  a  policy  of  stabilizing  interest  rates  to...slowing  money 
growth  rates  to  combat  inflation.  This  led  to...an  unprecedented  increase  in 
thrifts’  costs...with  almost  no  corresponding  increase  in  revenues....(  1988, 
p,  15).  Unable  to  withstand  the  strains  of  high  and  volatile  interest  rates, 
the  result  for  S&Ls  was  a  “financial  holocaust”  (Gray,  1984,  p.  1598). 
One  can,  in  retrospect,  censure  the  Federal  Reserve  for  ignoring  the  prob- 
lems  of  S&Ls  and/or  for  its  unwillingness  to  exercise  restraint  earlier  (and 
presumably  more  gradually).  In  a  fragmented  regulatory  system,  however, 
Federal  Reserve  accountability  has  been  obfuscated  by  the  inadequate  stan- 
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dards  established  by  independent  supervisory  agencies  whose  policies  were 
generally  oblivious  to  the  potential  impact  of  monetary  surprise  and  other 
exogenous  shocks.  The  defect  does  not  lie  with  individual  agencies,  but 
with  their  separation  from  one  another.  ‘: 
The  responsibilities  imposed  by  monetary  policy,  as  currently  conducted, 
require  an  involvement  in  the  supervision  of  all  depository  institutions.  A 
continuous  stream  of  current  information  on  the  condition  of  banks  is 
needed  to  ascertain  the  likely  effects  of  policy.  While  it  is  not  possible  to 
anticipate  a  particular  shock9  more  can  be  done  in  preparation.10 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  principal  government  studies  of  the  last  30  years 
have  reserved  a  role  for  the  Federal  Reserve,  apparently  concurring  with  the 
Bush  Report  that:  “  .  ..the  FR3  should  maintain...supervisory  and  regulatory 
authority  to  back  up  its  responsibilities  as  the  central  bank”  (p.  48).  But 
this  “backup”  objective  cannot  be  met  in  a  fragmented  system. 
It  is  conceivable  that  agency  differences  might  be  overcome  by  negotiation 
and  agreement,  informally  or  through  formal  interagency  organization 
(Holland,  1975),  but  it  is  unlikely.  There  is  little  evidence  that  informal 
negotiation  has  been  effective.  There  has  yet  to  be  a  full  evaluation  of  the 
Federal  Financial  Institution  Examination  Council  (FFIEC),  but  without 
authority  to  impose  even  negotiated  recommendations,  this  organization 
cannot  be  viewed  as  a  reasonable  substitute  for  consolidation.11 
In  considering  regulatory  reorganization,  the  objectives  need  to  be  kept  in 
mind.  In  general,  unification  of  the  regulatory  agencies  is  needed  for  pur- 
poses  of  efficiency,  policy  planning,  and  establishing  accountability.  In  par- 
ticular,  it  is  needed  to  come  to  grips  with  the  systemic  problems  that  afflict 
the  banking  system.  At  the  same  time,  there  may  be  benefits  associated  with 
a  multiple  agency  structure  that  should  be  retained,  if  possible;  in  particu- 
lar,  protection  against  the  weaknesses  of  excessive  concentration  of  regula- 
tory  power. 
Alternative  organizational  structures  can  be  considered.  A  new  agency 
might  be  established  into  which  the  existing  ones  would  be  merged-or  all 
could  be  merged  into  an  existing  agency.  Substantively,  there  would  be  no 
real  difference,  but  merger  into  an  existing  agency  is  likely  to  involve  a  sim- 
pler  transition. 
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Of  the  existing  agencies,  consolidation  might  be  in  the  Treasury  (Office  of 
the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency),  the  Federal  Reserve,  or  the  FDIC  [the 
smaller  NCUA  does  not  seem  a  likely  candidate].  The  principal  distinction 
would  be  between  an  executive  branch  agency  and  one  that  is  “indepen- 
dent”  (Le.,  directly  responsible  to  Congress).  Consolidation  in  the  Treasury 
would  mean  the  elimination  of  an  independent  Federal  Reserve.  While  this 
has  been  proposed  from  time  to  time,  it  raises  issues  that  are  likely  to  evoke 
more  controversy  than  regulatory  reorganization:  What  remains  is  consoli- 
dation  in  the  Federal  Reserve  or  the  FDIC. 
There  are  independent  reasons  for  selecting  consolidation  in  the  Federal 
Reserve.  It  is  the  only  banking  agency  whose  structure  was  originally 
designed  to  deal  with  concerns  about  uconcentration  of  power”  (Hoz4se 
&zn&zg  Report,  1913,  pp.  11-12).  Despite  subsequent  changes,  it  still 
retains  quasi-independent  regional  banks  and  diversified  public  and  private 
representation.  It  appears  to  be  a  rare,  if  not  unique,  governmental  organi- 
zation  in  that  internal  differences  have  been  publicly  disseminated  over  long 
periods  of  time. 
While  there  are  some  practical  reasons  for  taking  this  route,  others  may  dic- 
tate  a  new  organization  entirely.  If  this  were  the  case,  each  function,  includ- 
ing  monetary  policy,  could  be  established  as  a  “subsidiary”  of  a  new, 
loosely  controlled,  holding  company-type  agency.  Resolution  of  differ- 
ences,  coordination,  and  general  policy  planning  would  be  ultimately 
imposed  by  a  “parent”  board. 
The  functional  subsidiary  model  would  preserve  the  separate  identities  of 
each  “function,”  and  some  intra-organization  rivalry.  With  both  regional 
(Reserve  Bank-like  organizations)  and  functional  subsidiaries,  there  should 
be  possibilities  for  both  experimentation  and  innovation.- 
Because  of  the  agglomeration  of  banking  and  monetary  authority  in  one 
agency,  some  modification  of  the  board  might  be  considered,  whether  or 
not  consolidation  was  within  the  existing  Federal  Reserve  System.  The 
“Executive  Directors”  of  the  functional  subsidiaries  might  be  appointed  by 
the  President  with  the  consent  of  Congress,  and  also  serve  as  Governors  of 
the  parent  board.  The  interests  of  the  executive  branch  might  be  accommo- 
dated  by  including  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  on  the  parent  board. 
Because  there  is  a  need  for  accountability,  the  terms  of  office  for  the  board 
members  might  be  5  or  6  years  rather  than  14  years. 
Any  such  overhaul  of  the  current  regulatory  organization  requires,  of 
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course,  more  detailed  development.  A  full  examination  of  structural  options 
is  in  order. 
One  final  point  merits  attention:  The  operational  difficulties  created  by 
meeting  the  complex  objectives  of  regulation  and  supervision  suggest  a  need 
to  raise  the  level  of  qualification  for  top  supervisory  officials.  Within  the 
context  of  the  proposed  organizational  structure,  supervision  should  com- 
mand  leadership  of  the  first  rank,  no  less  qualified  in  economic  and  finan- 
cial  market  analysis  than  Federal  Reserve  Board  chairmen.  The  qualities 
that  some  high-level  supervisors  currently  bring  to  the  job  have  been  insuf- 
ficient  to  deal  with  the  problems  supervision  must  deal  with  if  it  is  to  be 
successful. 
A  regulatory  reorganization  to  promote  efficiency,  planning,  and  account-l 
ability  is  needed.  There  exists  a  strong  case  for  full  consolidation  of  bank 
regulation  and  supervision,  deposit  insurance  and  monetary  policy.  In  par- 
ticular,  the  fragmentation  of  the  regulatory  system  may  be  viewed  as  an 
institutional  failure  that  needs  to  be  overcome  to  address  other  systemic 
problems  that  have  repeatedly  resulted  in  banking  problems. 
An  approach  to  regulatory  agency  consolidation  that  would  combine  the 
related  functions  in  either  a  modified  Federal  Reserve  System  or  a  new 
organization  modeled  on  a  functional  subsidiary  basis  is  proposed.  Such 
reorganization  would  integrate  supervision  and  regulation  with  monetary 
policy  and  deposit  insurance,  and  facilitate  effective  agency  planning  while 
sustaining  the  values  of  the  existing  arrangements. 
The  author  wishes  to  acknowledge  the  helpful  discussion  with  and  comments  by 
Hyman  Minsky  of  Tbe]erome  Levy  Economics  Institute,  and  also  the  comments  of 
Pbillip  Bartholomew  of  tbe  Cotzgressional  Budget  office,  Joe  Cleaver  of  tbe  Federal 
Financial  Institution  Examinution  Council,  and  Gerald  Hanweck  of  George  Mason 
University  on  earlier  versions  of  tbis  paper. 
Tbe  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College  27 The  Limits  of  Prudential  Supervision 
1  More  extensive  development  of  the  bases  for  the  proposal  may  be  found  in 
Shull,  1992;  see  also  Shull  1993. 
2  The  recent’recoveryis  largely  attributable  to  an  unprecedented  spread  between 
long-term  and  short-term  rates.  It  is  indicative,  as  discussed  below,  of  the  effects 
of  monetary  policy  and  related  macro-economic  conditions  on  bank  profitabil- 
ity. 
3  Shocks  have  been  defined  as  low  probability  hazards  carrying  high  potential 
costs  (Guttentag  &  Herring,  1986,  pp.  2,32-33).  It  has  been  observed  that  “the 
continuing  potential  for  credit  crunches  has  usually  been  underestimated....” 
(Kaufman,  1991).  Bank  management  has  no  basis  on  which  to  calculate  Rroba- 
bilities.  Such  events,  it  has  been  suggested,  do  not  emerge  from  an  ergotic  pro- 
cess  (Davidson,  1988,  pp.  332-33,  and  1991).  In  these  circumstances,  rational 
expectation  and  efficient  market  axioms  do  not  apply. 
4  In  addition,  supervisory  efforts  to  strengthen  weak  banks  focus  on  earnings 
from  which  most  new  bank  capital  has  come.  Restraining  weak,  much  less 
seemingly  healthy,  banks  in  a  vigorously  growing  economy,  and  in  the  face  of 
unrestrained  competitors,  conflicts  with  traditional  supervisory  aims  to  support 
bank  earnings  and  not  to  interfere  with  successful  bank  management. 
5  The  term  “insider  abuse”  refers  to  “misconduct”  by  officers,  directors,  and 
other  insiders  of  depository  institutions  for  purposes  of  personal  enrichment, 
without  regard  to  the  safety  and  soundness  of  the  institution,  and  in  violation  of 
civil  banking  laws  or  regulations  and/or  criminal  banking  laws.  “Criminal  mis- 
conduct”  (“fraud”)  refers  to  criminal  acts  committed  by  “insiders”  for  the  same 
purpose  (Federal  Response  to  Criminal  Misconduct,  1984,  p.  2).  The  growth  in 
insider  abuse  and  misconduct  is  evidenced  in  congressional  reports,  orders  by 
regulatory  authorities,  criminal  referrals,  civil  suits,  and  the  expansion  of  bank 
examination  staffs  and  costs  (Fraud  in  America’s  Insured  Depository 
Itzstittbms,  1991;  qfectivetzess  of  Law  Enforcement  Against  Financial  Crime, 
1990,  pp.  397:9g;  444;Seidman~  1990;  Federal  Response  to  Criminal 
Misconduct,  1984). 
6  a, Stewardship  has  been  defined  as  involving  a  trust  relationship  in  which  the 
word  of  a  party  can  be  taken  as  its  bond  (Williamson,  1975,  p.  26);  it  suggests 
some  degree  of  self-denial,  at  least  in  the  short  run,  and  obedience  to  rules. 
7  An  adjusted  risk  asset  approach  was  originally  adopted  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  New  York  in  1952.  In  1956  it  added  a  liquidity  test  that  required  more 
capital  from  banks  that  were  less  liquid  (Crosse,  1962,  pp.  173ff.).  The  board 
amended  its  capital  adequacy  approach  in  1972  to  consider  the  experience  of 
banks  in  the  1969-70  period  of  disintermediation  (Vojta,  1973,  p.  11;  see 
Appendix  2  for  the  revised  ABC  form  developed  by  board).  The  Fed’s  approach 
was  differentiated  from  that  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  who  deempha- 
sized  “ratio  analysis”  in  favor  of  general  guidelines  “...appropriate  for  banks 
operating  in  normal  conditions”  (Vojta,  1973,  p.  11). 
8  A  joint  proposal  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  the.  Federal  Reserve,  and 
the  FDIC  was  issued  July  30,  1992,  and  revised  March  31,  1993.  See  Hanweck 
&  Shull,  1993. 




Final  rules,  including  the  definitions  developed  by  the  federal  supervisory  agen- 
cies,  but  not  including  requirements  for  interest-rate  risk,  were  issued  in 
September  1992  and  went  into  effect  on  December  19,1992. 
Accounting  systems  that  reveal  bank  exposure  to  nonspecific  events  of  varying 
impact  would  inform  supervisors  and  give  them  some  leverage  in  confronting 
bank  managements  (Minsky,  1971,  pp.  124-29;  Minsky,  1975;  Guttentag  & 
Herring,  1988).  It  should  also  be  possible  to  develop  more  complex  models, 
with  regional  as  well  as  national  banking  sectors,  and  to  simulate  economic  and 
financial  shocks. 
A  GAO  study  in  1984  was  critical  of  its  performance  (Comptroller  General  of 
the  U.S.,  1984).  For  a  history  of  the  FFIEC  from  an  insider’s  point  of  view,  see 
Lawrence,  1992. 
Tbe]erome  Levy  Ecoraomics  Znstitute  of  Bard  College  29 The  Limits  of  Prudential  Supervision 
f?eferemceks 
Barth,  J.,  P.  Bartholomew,  and  C.  Labich,  “Moral  Hazard  and  the  Thrift  Crisis:  An 
Empirical  Analysis,”  Consumer  Finance  Law,  Quarterly  Report,  winter  1990, 
pp.  22-34. 
Brady,  N.,  “Blueprint  for  Reform:  Report  of  the  Task  Group  on  Regulation  of 
Financial  Services,”  July  1984. 
-,  “Statement,”  Treasury  News,  Feb.  6,  1989. 
Brumbaugh,  R.  D.,  Thrifts  Under  Siege,  Balhnger  Publishing  Co.,  Cambridge,  Mass., 
1988.  \ 
Burns,  A.,  “Maintaining  the  Soundness  of  Our  Banking  System,”  Address  to  the 
Convention  of  the  American  Bankers  Association,  Honolulu,  Hawaii,  October 
21,  1975. 
Changes  in  the  Banking  &  Currency  System  of  the  United  States,  Committee  on 
Banking  and  Currency,  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  63rd  Cong.,  1st  Sess., 
Report  No.  69,  Sept.  9,  1913  (cited  as  House  Banking  Repyt). 
Clarke,  R.  L.,  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  “Statement”  in  Problems  of  the  Federal 
Savings  and  Loan  Insurance  Corporation  (FSLlC),  presented  to  the  Committee 
on  Banking,  Housing,  and  Urban  Affairs,  February  28,1989,  pp.  240ff. 
-3  “Letter”  to  Henry  B.  Gonzales,  Chairman,  Committee  on  Banking,  Finance, 
and  Urban  Affairs,  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  September  22,  1991. 
Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  Annual  Reports,  1914,1930,1988. 
Comptroller  General  of  the  United  States,  Federal  Supervision  of  State  and  National 
Banks,  January  1977. 
T  -  ,  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council  Has  Made  Limited 
Progress  Toward  Accomplishing  Its  Mission,  GAO,  February  3,  1984. 
Crosse,  H.  D.,  Management  Policies  for  Commercial  Banks,  Prentice  Hall,  Inc., 
Englewood  Cliffs,  N.J.,  1962. 
Davidson,  P.,  uA  Technical  Definition  of  Uncertainty  and  the  Long-run 
Nonneutrality  of  Money,”  Cambridge  Journul  of  Economics,  Vol.  12,  1988, 
pp.  329-337. 
-7  “Is  Probability  Theory  Relevant  for  Uncertainty?  A  Post-Keynesian 
Perspective,”  The  Journal  of  Economic  Perspectives,  Winter  1991,  pp.  129-43. 
Effectiveness  of  Law  Enforcement  Against  Financial  Crime,  Field  Hearing  before  the 
Committee  on  Banking,  Finance,  and  Urban  Affairs,  U.S.  House  of 
Representatives,  Part  2,  April  12,  1990. 
FDIC,  Annual  Report,  1984. 
30  Public  Policy  Brief Reorganizing  the  Federal  Bank  Regulatory  Agencies 
Federal  Reserve  Board,  “The  Federal  Reserve  Position  on  Restructuring  of  Financial 
Responsibilities,”  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  July  1984,  pp.  547-557. 
Federal  Response  to  Criminal  Misconduct  and  Insider  Abuse  in  the  Nation’s 
Finuncial  hstitutiotis,  Committee  on  Government  Operations,  U.S.  House  of 
Representatives,  98th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  October,  4,  1984. 
First  Meeting  on  the  Condition  of  the  Banking  System,  Hearings  before  the 
Committee  on  Banking,  Housing,  and  Urban  Affairs,  U.S.  Senate,  March  lo- 
ll,  1977. 
Friedman,  M.  and  A.  J.  Schwartz,  A  Monetary  History  of  the  United  States, 
Princeton  University  Press,  Princeton,  N.J.,  1963. 
Fraud  in  America’s  Insured  Depository  Znstitutions,  Hearings  before  the  Committee 
on  Banking,  Housing,  and  Urban  Affairs,  U.S.  Senate,  August  1,2,  1990. 
Gephart,  W.  F.,  “Our  Commercial  Banking  System,”  American  Echomic  Review: 
Supplement,  March  1935. 
Golbe,  D.  and  B.  Shull,  “Risk  Taking  by  Thrift  Institutions,”  Contemporury  Policy 
Zssues, July  1991. 
Gray,  E.  J.,  Testimony  before  the  Committee  on  Banking,  Finance,  and  Urban 
Affairs,  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  April  11,  1984. 
Greenspan,  A.,  Testimony  before  the  Committee  on  Banking,  Housing,  and  Urban 
Affairs,  U.S.  Senate,  February  23,  1989. 
Guttentag,  J.,  “Reflections  on  Bank  Regulatory  Structure  and  Large  Bank  Failures,” 
Proceedings  of  a  Conference  on  Bank  Structure  and  Competition,  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  Chicago,  1975,  pp.  136-149. 
Guttentag,  J.  and  R.  Herring,  Disaster  Myopia  in  Internutional  Banking,  Essays  in 
International  Finance,  No.  164,  International  Finance  Section,  Princeton 
University,  September  1986. 
-,  “Prudential  Supervision  to  Manage  Systemic  Vulnerability,”  Proceedings  of  a 
Conference  on  Bunk  Structure  and  Competition,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Chicago,  May  1988,  pp.  602-33. 
Hackley,  H.,  “Our  Discriminating  Banking  System,”  55  Virginia  Law  Review,  1421 
(1969). 
Hammond,  B.,  Banks  and  Politics  in  America,  Princeton  University  Press,  Princeton, 
N.J.,  1957. 
Hanweck,  G.  and  B.  Shull,  uMonetary  Policy  and  the  Condition  of  Banks,”  Paper 
presented  at  Meetings  of  Western  Economic  Association,  July  1992. 
-,  “Interest  Rate  Risk  and  Capital  Adequacy:  An  Appraisal  of  the  Federal 
Banking  Agencies’  Proposal,  January  1993,  forthcoming,  The  Bankers 
Magazine. 
The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College  3% The  Limits  of  Prudential  Supervision 
Holland,  R.  G.,  “Statement”  in  Federul  Bank  Commission  Act,  Hearings  before  the 
Committee  on  Banking,  Housing,  and  Urban  Affairs,  U.S.  Senate,  94th 
Congress,  1st  Session,  Oct.-Nov.,  1975,  pp.  285-88. 
Horvitz,  P.  M.,  “Consolidation  of  the  Regulatory  Agency  Structure:  Has  the  Time 
for  It  Come,”  Economic  Reviezu,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Atlanta,  December 
1982. 
Houpt,  J.  V.  and  J.  A.  Embersit,  “A  Method  for  Evaluating  Interest  Rate  Risk  in  U.S. 
Commercial  Banks,”  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  August  1991,  pp.  625-637. 
Huston,  T.  H.,  “Dual  Standards  in  Soundness  and  Safety  Regulation,”  Proceedings 
of  a  Conference  on  Bank  Structure  and  Competition,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Chicago,  1985,  pp.  542-51. 
Isaac,  W.,  Chairman,  FDIC,  How  the  Financial  System  Can  Best  Be  Shaped  to  Meet 
the  Needs  of  the  American  People,  Hearings  before  the  Committee  on 
Banking,  Finance,  and  Urban  Affairs,  98th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  April,  May,  June 
1984. 
Kaufman,  H.,  “Credit  Crunches:  The  Deregulators  Were  Wrong,”  W#  Street 
Journal,  October  9,199l. 
Lapidus,  L.,  St&e  and  Federal  Regulation  of  Commercial  Banks,  FDIC,  Washington, 
D.C.,  1980. 
Lawrence,  R.,  Origin  and  Development  of  the  Examination  Council,  Federal 
Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council,  February  1992. 
Mauskopf,  E.,  “Structure  and  Uses  of  the  MPS  Quarterly  Econometric  Model  of  the 
U.S.,”  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  February  1987,  pp.  93-109. 
-,  “The  Transmission  Channels  of  Monetary  Policy:  How  Have  They  Changed,” 
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  December  1990,  pp.  985-1008. 
Minsky,  H.  P.,  “Central  Banking  and  Money  Market  Changes,n  Quarterly  Journal 
of  Economics,  Vol.  LXXI,  No.  2,  May  1957. 
-,  -Financial  Instability  Revisited,”  Reappraisal  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Discount 
Mechanism,  Vol.  3,  Federal  Reserve  Board,  1971,  pp.  95-136. 
-,  “Suggestions  for  a  Cash  Flow-Oriented  Bank  Examination,”  Proceedings  of  a 
Conference  on  Bank  Structure  und  Competition,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Chicago,  1975,  pp.  150-184. 
-,  Stabilizing  an  Unstable  Economy,  Yale  University  Press,  New  Haven,  Conn., 
1986. 
Peterson,  M.  O.,  “Conflicts  Between  Monetary  Policy  and  Bank  Supervision,”  Issues 
in  Bunk  Regulation,  Autumn  1977. 
Rehm,  B.  A.,  “Regulators  Loosen  FDICIA’s  Handcuffs,‘?  American  Banker, 
December  2,1992. 
32  Public  Policy  Brief Reorganizing  the  Federal  Bank  Regulatory  Agencies 
Robertson,  J.  L.,  “Federal  Regulation  of  Banking:  A  Plea  for  Unification,”  L,aw  and 
Contemporary  Problems,  Vol.  31.  No.  4,  Autumn  1966,  pp.  673-95. 
Robertson,  R.  M.,  The  Comptroller  and  Bank  Supervision,  Office  of  the  Comptroller 
of  the  Currency,  Washington,  D.C.,  1968. 
Scott,  K.  E.,  “The  Dual  Banking  System:  A  Model  of  Competition  in  Regulation,” 
Zssues  in  Financial  Regulation,  F.  R.  Edwards,  ed.,  McGraw  Hill  Book  Co., 
New  York,  1979. 
Seidman,  L.  W.,  “Testimony  on  the  Prosecution  of  Financial  Crimes,”  Subcommittee 
on  Criminal  Justice,  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  U.S.  House  of 
Representatives,  July  11,  1990. 
Senate  Banking  Report,  Operation  of  the  National  and  Federal  Reserve  Banking 
Systems,  U.S.  Senate,  73rd  Cong.,  1st  Sesssx.Rept.  No.  77,  May  15,  1933. 
Shull,  B.,  “Federal  and  State  Supervision  of  Bank  Holding  Companies”  in  State  and 
Federal  Regulation  of  Commercial  Banks,  L.  Lapidus  (ed.),  FDIC, 
Washington,  D.C.,  1980,  pp.  271-374. 
-9  uThe  Limits  of  Prudential  Supervision:  Economic  Problems,  Institutional 
Failure  and  Competence,”  1992. 
-  “How  Should  Bank  Regulatory  Agencies  Be  Organized,”  Contempbrary  Policy  , 
Studies,  January  1993. 
Spahr,  W.,  “Bank  Failures  in  the  United  States,”  American  Economic  Review: 
Supplement,  March  1932. 
U.S.  Department  of  the  Treasury,  Modernizing  the  Financial  System,  February  1991 
(cited  as  Treasury  Report,  1991). 
Vojta,  G.,  Bank  Capital  Adequacy,  First  National  City  Bank,  New  York,  N.Y., 
1973. 
Williamson,  0.  E.,  Markets  and  Hierarchies:  Analysis  and  Antitrust  Zmplications, 
The  Free  Press,  New  York,  1975. 
-9  The  Economic  Znstitutions  of  Capitalism,  The  Free  Press,  New  York,  1985. 
The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Znstitute  of  Bard  College  33 About  the Authors 
Bernard  Shull  is  Professor  of  Economics  at 
Hunter  College,  a  member  of  the  Graduate 
Faculty  of  the  City  University  of  New  York, 
and  a  Special  Consultant  to  National 
Economic  Research  Associates,  Inc.  His  prior 
experience  includes  teaching  at  the  Wharton 
School  at  the  University  of  Pennsylvania  and 
the  University  of  Illinois.  Dr.  Shull  has  served 
as  Associate  Advisor  to  the  Board  of 
Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board, 
Chief  of  the  Banking  Markets  Section,  and 
Research  Director  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
Reappraisal  of  the  Discount  Mechanism. 
Additionally,  Dr.  Shull  was  a  Senior 
Economist  with  the  Office  of  the  Comptroller 
of  the  Currency  and  an  Economist  at  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Philadelphia. 
Hyman  P.  Minsky  is  a  Distinguished  Scholar 
at  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of 
Bard  College,  and  Professor  Emeritus  of 
Economics  at  Washington  University,  St. 
Louis.  Professor  Minsky  is  the  author  of  John 
Maynard  Keynes,  Can  “It”  Happen  Again, 
and  Stabilizing  an  Unstable  Economy. 
The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College  3§ 